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1. Introduction 
A Rational Choice Approach 
TAROHMARU, Hiroshi (Osaka University) 
Since \Vorld \Var II, higher education has e::>..'})anded in many industrial societies such 
as the United States., England., Germany and Japan. Less than 10 percent of students 
went on to university 50 years ago in Japan, but nowadays, nearly 40 percent of 
students do. In spite of the educational expansion, a class differential in educational 
attainment (CDEA) has been little changed in many industrial societies (Goldthorpe 
2000). Because the expansion of service-class children going on to university is almost 
comparable \vith that of working-class children, the differential between them has been 
sustained in many industrial societies. Goldthorpe (2000) e::>..'})lains these phenomena, 
based on rational choice theory. According to him, there have been two factors: one 
raising CDEA and the other reducing it, and these two factors have offset each other. 
Therefore, CDEA has not changed. Goldthorpe (2000) argues that the factor reducing 
CDEA is a decline in educational cost. In England, for example, university fee was 
reduced after \Vorld \Var II. It raised the percentage of children who go on to university 
in both service and working classes, but it had also an effect to reduce CDEA, because 
the decline of educational cost gave an opportunity to more working-class children than 
service-class children. On the other hand, the factor raising CDEA, according to 
Goldthorpe (2000), is the increasing importance of education, in other words, increasing 
difficulty of entering the service class without university education. This gave incentive 
to go on to university to more service-class children than ,Yorking-class children, 
because working-class children don't always want to enter the service class but 
service-class children do. These two factors offset each other and CDEA has not been 
changed. \Ve call this Goldthorpe hypothesis. 
Goldthorpe hypothesis has several minor flaws. Firstly, he doesn't prove a decline in 
educational cost reduces CDEA. Secondly, Goldthorpe hypothesis can't e::>..'})lain why 
CDEA has not been changed in Japan in spite of an increase in the cost of university 
education. Thirdly it is not clear how much the importance of university education has 
been increased since VlV.;r II. According to Takeuchi (1991), university education ,vas 
already very important before \V\V II. Other factors might have had an effect to increase 
CDEA in Japan. The aim of this paper is to extend Goldthorpe hypothesis and make it 
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applicable to the Jqpanese case. Firstly, we \yill show that an increase in educational 
cost doesn't always entail an increase in CDEA. It sometimes reduces CDEA, because 
more service-class children sometimes lose an opportunity for university education than 
working-class children do owing to the increase in educational cost. Therefore the 
increase in educational cost might have had an effect to reduce CDEA in Japan. 
Secondly, we ,,,ill show that the expansion of the service class has an effect to raise 
CDEA, based on the rational-choice model into which Goldthorpe hypothesis is slightly 
modified. These extensions of Goldthorpe hypothesis will help us to understand why 
CDEA has little been changed in Japan. 
2. Effect of Change of Educational Cost 
In this section, we will analyze a model in which it is determined only by resource 
whether a child goes on to university or not. If shelhe has enough resource, the child 
goes on to university in our model. If shelhe doesn't, the child can't. This assumption 
might be too simple, because other factors have an effect on her/his decision in reality. 
Owing to the simplicity, however, our model will help to understand the relationship 
between educational cost and resource distribution on the one hand, and the class 
differential in educational attainment, on the other hand. 
2.1. Axioms of the First Model 
Axiom 1: Class Structure 
Class structure consists of three classes: service, working and under classes. The service 
class is the highest and the under class is the lowest. 
Axiom 2: Exclusion of under class children from analysis 
\Ve analyze only the choices and actions of service- and working- classes children and 
exclude those of underclass children from our analysis in this paper. 
This is for simplicity, and Goldthorpe (2000) is also based on the same axiom. 
Axiom 3: Measure of CDEA 
The measure of CDEA between the service and working classes is odds ratio between 
them: 
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OE odds ratio of CDEA between service and working classes. 
qs: the ratio of service-class children who go on to university. 
qw: the ratio of working-class children who go on to university. 
We suppose that qs: is larger than qw: for simplification. It means that OR is always 
larger than 1. 
From Axioms 2 and 3, it follows that we deal with only the odds ratio between the 
service and working classes. The reason "vhy ,""re pick up the odds ratio among several 
measures of a class differential is that Goldthorpe has used it in his books (Goldthorpe 
1987, 2000, Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). 
Axiom 4: Educational Cost 
Suppose that Ct is the cost of education at a time t. If a child (or hislher family) has more 
resource than Ct, helshe goes on to university. 
Axiom 5: Distribution of resource 
Suppose that the amounts of resource of service- and working-classes children are 15 
and l'w respectively, and they have log-normal distribution with means m(l's) and m(rll), 
(m (rs) > m (1'11) . 
\Ve would operationally confine the concept of resource to money, because it is easier 
to test our hypothesis. 
2.2. Decline of Educational Cost raises CDEA 
Figul"e 1 shows that the relationship between educational cost and the class 
differential in educational attainment (CDEA) between the service and working classes. 
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Figure 1 Effect of decline in educational cost 
cost down 
i-Working Class 
1- . -. - -. Service Class 
The dotted curve is resource distribution among service-class children, and the thick 
curve is that among working-class children. Suppose that educational cost is aJ at a time 
to. Then only children who have more resource than aJ go on to university_ Suppose that 
the educational cost is reduced from aJ to Cl at a time tl. Then children who have 
resource more than Cl and less than aJ newly obtain the chance of going on to university 
at a time tI. As Figure 1 shows, the increase in the ratio of children who get the new 
chance at tl is larger among service-class children than among working-class children. 
In other words, qs increases more rapidly than qwat fl. Therefore, the odds ratio is 
increased. If the educational cost is reduced furthermore from Cl to 02 at a time f2, then 
more working-class children newly get the chance of going on to university than 
service-class children do. In this case, qw increases more rapidly than qs at &2. Therefore, 
the odds ratio is decreased. In other words, when the price elasticity of the service class 
is higher than that of the working class, the decline in educational cost raises CDEA. 
The height of each curve shows price elasticity corresponding to the cost in Figure l. 
Roughly speaking, therefore, when educational cost is extraordinarily ex-pensive, few 
working class children go on to university and CDEA is very high. However, a little 
decrease in educational cost would raise CDEA, because it gives more service-class 
children the educational opportunity than working-class children. Only 'when 
educational cost is decreased until the price elasticity of the \vorking class exceeds that 
of the service class, CDEA is reduced. 
\Ve will now inquire into ,vhat happens \"hen educational cost is increased, as is the 
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case in Japan. As long as the price elasticity of the working class is higher than that of 
the service class, the increase in educational cost raises CDEA. Because more 
working-class children would lose an opportunity to go on to university than 
service-class children do, owing to the increase in educational cost. On the other hand, 
when the price elasticity of the service class is higher than that of the working class, 
increase in educational cost reduces CDEA. 
The increase in educational cost sometimes has an effect to reduce CDEA. The cost of 
university education in Japan has been considerably high since Vi,TW II. \Vhen the cost is 
high, the price elasticity of the service class tends to be higher than that of the working 
class. \Ve, therefore, give an alternative hypothesis to explain the Japanese case; the 
cost up of university education had an effect to reduce CDEA in post-\VWII Japan. 
3. Effect of Service-Class Expansion 
In this section, we will give another model in which a child maximizes herlhis 
expected utility. Service- and working classes children have utility functions different 
from each other. Service-class children try to maximize the probability of attaining the 
service class, but working-class children try to maximize the probability of attaining the 
service or working class. In other words, they try to minimize the probability of 
attaining to the under class, although we don't deal with under class children in this 
paper as mentioned earilier. It means that both classes' children try to minimize the 
probability of downward mobility. University education helps both service- and working 
classes children to raise the probability of attaining to the service class, if they succeed 
in entering and graduating a good university. Investing in education is risky, however, 
because they might fail in entrance into or graduation from a good university. If service-
or working- class children enter into the labor market without investing in university 
education, the probability of downward mobility is lo\ver than if they invest and fail in 
university education. This model also might be too simple, because it neglects some 
important factors including the cost and resource we analyzed in the previous section. It, 
however, will help us to understand the relationship between the service-class 
expansion and the class differential in educational attainment (CDEN. 
3.1. Axioms of the Second model 
vVe use Axiom 1, 2 and 3 in section 2 again. But, we don't Axiom 4 and 5. 
Axiom 6: Choices of Children 
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Each child has the choice of investing in university education and staying in the 
educational track, or not, i.e. entering the labor market. 
Axiom 7: Outcomes of Investment in Education 
Investment in higher education has two outcomes: success or failul·e. Success means 
entering and graduating a good university successfully. Failure means failing in the 
entrance or graduation. We suppose that a child investing in university education can 
go on to a university whether shelhe succeeds or fails, because we assume that even a 
child who failed can go on to a university that is oflittle help for upward mobility. 
Axiom 8: Probability of Success 
The subjective conditional probability of the future success in entering into and 
graduating from a good university, JC has a uniform distribution in each class. The 
assumption of a uniform distribution may be too strong, because it is well known that 
service-class children get better school records than working class children do on 
average. It is, therefore, more reasonable to assume that service-class children have the 
higher probability of success than working-class children do. We will relax this 
assumption in the next paper. 







Failure, 1- JC 
a Service Class 
Working Class 
/31 Service Class 
732 
Working Class 
1- /31- /32 Under class 
Xl Service class 
'''orking Class 
1- .%1- X2 Under class 
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Axiom 9: Probability of Class Attainment 
If a child invests and successes in university education, the conditional probabilities of 
attaining to the service, working and under classes are a, 1- a and 0 respectively. If 
shelhe fails, the conditional probabilities of attaining to the service, working and under 
classes are /31, j3z and 1- /31 - /32. If a child enters into the labor market, they are Xl, X2 
and 1-X1- X2 in the same way. \Ve suppose that /31 is equal or smaller than Xl, and j3z is 
smaller than X2, because it seems that if a child fails in the investment of university 
education, it wouldn't improve the probability of attaining the service class. Additionally, 
the probability of attaining to the working class seems larger when a child enters in the 
labor market directly, than when shelhe tries to go on to university and fails. They are 
constants among all children at a given time t; for example, a has the same value for 
both service- and working- classes children. However, these probabilities vary as time 
passes because of structural or forced mobility. 
Axiom 10: Utility Functions 
A service-class child's utility, Usis equal to the probability of his attaining to the service 
class. A working-class child's utility, Uwis equal to the probability of his attaining to the 
service or working class. 
3.2. Conditions for Investing in University Education 
\Ve can now figure out the utilities of each class's child when she/he invests in 
university education and when shelhe enters into the labor market. If a service-class 
child invests, herlhis expected utility is derived from Axioms as below; 
Us= Jra+ (1- ~ /31. 
Because the probability of attaining to the service class is awhen shelhe succeeds, and 
it is /31 when shelhe fails. If a service-class child enters into the labor market, the 
expected utility is: 
Us= Xl. 
From these two equations, we can derive the condition for investing in education; 
1[ a + (1- 1[) /31 > Xl. 
1[ > <x 1- /31) / (a- /31). 
\Ve suppose that ps= (z1- /31) / (a- /31). Then, the above equation is rev,Titten as below: 
1[> ps (1). 
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psis the threshold value of investment in university education for service-class children. 
If IT is larger than ps then it is rational for them to invest and go on to university. 
In the same way, we can calculate the utilities of a working class child and the 
condition for investing in university education. If shelhe invests in higher education, 
Uw= IT+ (1- m(jJl+ P2). 
Ifhe/she leaves from the educational track, 
Uw= Xl + X2. 
From the above two equations, we can derive the condition for investing education; 
IT+ (1- m( jJl+ P2) > Xl + X2. 
IT> <Xl + X2 - XI- X2) / (1- JJI - P2). 
vVe suppose that pI!' = <Xl + X2 - jJl- fJz) / (1- jJi - /lz). Then, the above equation is 
rewritten as below: 
3.3. Ratio of Going on to University 
Equation (1) means that a service-class student \vho has a prospect of success in 
university education with a probability IT more than ps go on to university. The ratio of 
service-class children with IT more than ps is 1- ps, because we have assumed IT has a 
uniform distribution in .Axiom 8. Figure 3 shows the relationship between the ratio of 
children going on to university and ps. The shadowed area shows the ratio of service 
class children who invest in education, because they have ITlarger than ps. In the same 
way, the ratio of working children going on to university is 1- pw, In other words, 
qs= 1- ps, ,and 
qw = 1- pw, therefore 
(l-P~ 
OR = . Ps ... (3) (1- Pw)/ 
/Pw 
vVe can derive Equation (3) from Axiom 3. 
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Figure 3: Subjective Probability of Success and 
Ratio of Children going on to University 
he ratio of service-class children 
who go on to university 
o .-_____ -1..... __ ---'-1....-___ .. 
Ps 1 J[ (subjective probability of 
success in higher education) 
3.4. Expansion of Service Class Raises Class Differential in Educational Attainment 
We now will prove that the expansion of service class has an effect to raise the class 
differential in educational attainment (CDEN. Before proving it, we must add another 
axiom. 
Axiom 10 
When the ratio of service class increases a times, a, j31, and Xl also increase a times 
prop ortionally. 
Axiom 10 assumes that when the ratio of service class increases -in other words, 
structural or forced mobility happens-, the subjective probabilities of attaining to the 
service class would increase proportionally. 
Theorem: Expansion of Service Class Raises CDEA 
If the ratio of the service class expands, that of working class doesn't change and that 
of the under class reduces, CDEA between the service and working classes increases. In 
other words, if a (tl) = a'a (fD), (3 l(h)=a (3 l(tO), Y l(tl) = a Y l(fD), (32(t1)= (32(fD), Y 
2(tl) = Y 2(fD), and a > 1, then, OR(tl) > OR(tD). dtl) is a at a time tl, and similarly for 
(31(tl), (32(tl), Y l(tl), Y 2(tl), ps(tJ), pr0.Jl) and OR(tl). 
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Thus, the denominator of pll~fD) is larger than that of p~tl). .. {5) 
The numerator of Plf~to) - that of prt~tl) 
= (a-1)( r l(t{» - /3 1 (fD) ) ::::: 0, because Axiom 9 assumes PI ~ Xl 
a> 1 and r l(to) = or> /3 l(to) . 
Thus, the numerator OfPIf~tl) is equal to or larger than that ofpll~to). . .. (6) 
From (5) and (6), we derive Plf~tl) > prifD) ... (7). 
From Equation (3), 
Equation (4) shows that the numerator of OR(fD) is equal to that of OR(tl). Inequality (6) 
shows that the denominator of OR(to) is larger than that of OR(tl). Therefore, OR(to) is 
larger than OR(tl). 
End of Proof. 
This proof argues that the expansion of the service class doesn't change the ratio of the 
service-class children \"ho go on to university. Because the ex-pansion raises both 
0:, /31, and Xl proportionally, the threshold value doesn't change in the service class. On 
the other hand, the expansion of the service class has an effect to reduce the ratio of 
working-class children going on to university. Because of the service-class expansion, 
the risk of attaining to the underclass decreases, whether a working-class child goes on 
to university or not. However, the risk decreases more markedly ,,,hen she/he doesn't go 
on to university than when shelhe does. If working class children go on to university and 
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success, there is no risk of attaining to under class. Their utility is 1, the maximum 
value in this model. Thus, the expansion of service class doesn't improve the condition of 
the working-class children who go on to university and success. It makes the decrease in 
the risk limited when working class children go on to university. This difference raises 
the threshold value ps and reduce the ratio of working-class children going on to 
university. 
In fact, the service class has been expanded in Japan since WW II. Therefore, we can 
argue that the service-class expansion had an effect to raise CDEA in post-WW II 
Japan. 
4. Conclusion 
Goldthorpe hypothesis could explain the class differential in educational attainment 
(CDEA) in several European societies, but couldn't be simply applicable to Japan, 
because Japanese educational cost has been raised since \v\V II and university 
education was already very important before 'l,T\V II. To explain CDEA in Japan, we 
extended and developed Goldthorpe hypothesis. Firstly we showed the increase in 
educational cost has an effect to reduce CDEA under certain conditions_ Secondly, we 
demonstrated the expansion of the service class has an effect to raise CDEA. \Vith this 
extension, Goldthorpe hypothesis is applicable to CDEA in Japan. It is needless to say 
that we need further empirical tests to refine or confirm the hypothesis. 
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